Personal Jurisdiction in the Data Age: MacDermid v. Deiter\u27s Adaptation of International Shoe Amidst Supreme Court Uncertainty by Almy, Ryan
Maine Law Review 
Volume 66 Number 1 Article 11 
January 2013 
Personal Jurisdiction in the Data Age: MacDermid v. Deiter's 
Adaptation of International Shoe Amidst Supreme Court 
Uncertainty 
Ryan Almy 
University of Maine School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Internet Law Commons, 
and the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ryan Almy, Personal Jurisdiction in the Data Age: MacDermid v. Deiter's Adaptation of International Shoe 
Amidst Supreme Court Uncertainty, 66 Me. L. Rev. 327 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/11 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
 
 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE DATA AGE: 
MACDERMID V. DEITER’S ADAPTATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL SHOE AMIDST SUPREME COURT 
UNCERTAINTY 
Ryan Almy 
I.  MACDERMID 
II.  PENNOYER TO MCINTYRE: 135 YEARS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 JURISPRUDENCE 
III.  WHERE DOES MACDERMID FIT? 
 A.  Statutory Interpretation: Just How Long is the Arm? 
 B.  Due Process Analysis 
IV.  FIGURING OUT THE “SOMETIMES” 
 A.  Most of Us 
 B.  Hackers: Intentional Thieves 
 C.  Hackers: Cyber Attacks 
 D.  Gray Areas: Digital Trespass, SPAM, and Diminishing Bandwidth 
V.  CONCLUSION 
  
328 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE DATA AGE: 
MACDERMID V. DEITER’S ADAPTATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL SHOE AMIDST SUPREME COURT 
UNCERTAINTY 
Ryan Almy* 
In MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter,1 the Second Circuit held that a Connecticut 
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who allegedly used a 
computer in Canada to remotely access a computer server located in Connecticut in 
order to misappropriate proprietary, confidential electronic information belonging 
to a Connecticut corporation.2  This Note argues that, given the factual elements 
before the court, MacDermid was an unsurprising, orthodox, and proper holding in 
the context of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.3  However, the facts in 
MacDermid, and the corresponding limits inherent in the Second Circuit’s holding, 
reveal potentially gaping holes in our modern personal jurisdiction framework and 
its ability to respond to the realities of modern commerce and technology.  
This Note first analyzes the MacDermid opinion and, after briefly 
summarizing the history of jurisdictional jurisprudence, argues that the Second 
Circuit’s holding is an example of a court’s appropriate adaptation of the traditional 
personal jurisdiction framework to the data age.  Next, this Note presents factual 
scenarios beyond those present in MacDermid and explores potential responses to 
these issues under both the modern United States Supreme Court approach and the 
Second Circuit’s MacDermid analysis. This Note will conclude by arguing that, 
while the MacDermid approach exemplifies the proper exercise of a state court’s 
jurisdiction over a defendant whose only contact with the forum state is 
technological in nature, the Supreme Court’s recent foot-dragging leaves domestic 
electronic data protection in a potentially dangerous limbo. 
I. MACDERMID 
MacDermid, Inc., (“MacDermid”) is a “chemical company with its principal 
place of business in Waterbury, Connecticut.”4 It maintains computer servers that 
are physically located in Waterbury and on which MacDermid stores sensitive 
proprietary information.5 Employees of MacDermid and its subsidiaries agree, as a 
condition of employment, to safeguard and properly use such information, which 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maine School of Law.  For their respective integral 
contributions to this Note, the Author would like to extend his sincerest gratitude to Professors Martin 
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 1. 702 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 2. Id.  
 3. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 4. MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 727. 
 5. Id. 
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includes an agreement by the employee to refrain from transferring such 
information to a personal email account.6  Employees may access this information 
only by accessing the Waterbury servers.7 Likewise, MacDermid’s email system is 
housed by the Waterbury servers.8 Furthermore, by the terms of MacDermid’s 
employment contract, employees are privy to the storage and maintenance of the 
company email system and proprietary information in Waterbury, Connecticut.9 
Jackie Deiter is a Canadian citizen who lives in Fort Eerie, Ontario, Canada.10 
Between May 2008 and April 2011 she worked, in Canada, as an account manager 
for MacDermid's Canadian subsidiary, MacDermid Chemicals, Inc.11 As an 
account manager, her responsibilities included managing customer accounts, 
obtaining new customers, and providing customer technical support.12 Deiter has 
never been to Connecticut.13 
For reasons irrelevant to the analysis, MacDermid had opted to terminate 
Deiter’s employment, effective April 2011.14  Aware of her impending termination, 
Deiter used her work computer to send MacDermid’s allegedly confidential and 
proprietary data from her MacDermid employee email account to her personal 
email account for use on her personal computer.15  
MacDermid then brought suit against Deiter in the United States District Court 
for the District of Connecticut, alleging unauthorized access and misuse of a 
computer system and misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of 
Connecticut’s computer crimes and trade regulations statutes.16 The District 
Court’s jurisdiction17 was based on diversity of citizenship and Connecticut’s long-
arm statute.18 Deiter subsequently moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal 
                                                                                                     
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, No. 3:11-CV-00855-WWE, 2011 WL 6001625, at *1 (D. Conn. 
Nov. 30, 2011). 
 13. Id.  
 14. MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 727. 
 15. Id. Deiter admits sending the data to her personal email, but maintains she did so only because 
her work computer did not enable her to print documents, which she needed to do in preparation for a 
work-related presentation. MacDermid, 2011 WL 6001625, at *1. 
 16. MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 727. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52–59b(a) (2005) (“[A] court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over any nonresident individual  . . . who in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any 
business within the state; (2) commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for 
defamation of character arising from the act; (3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury 
to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising 
from the act, if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other 
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services 
rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the 
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; (4) owns, uses or 
possesses any real property situated within the state; or (5) uses a computer, as defined in subdivision 
(1) of subsection (a) of section 53-451, or a computer network, as defined in subdivision (3) of 
subsection (a) of said section, located within the state.”). 
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jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(2).19 The District Court granted her 
motion to dismiss, concluding that the long-arm statute did not reach Deiter's 
alleged conduct.20 In so finding, the District Court relied on the view that Deiter 
had not accessed a Connecticut computer, but had merely sent an email “from one 
computer in Canada to another computer in Canada.”21 Thus, according to the 
District Court, Deiter’s literal conduct was not within reach of Connecticut’s long-
arm provision22 that establishes personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant 
who uses a computer, as defined by the state computer crime statute,23 within the 
state.24 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed. Applying the traditional two-step 
jurisdictional analysis, the Circuit Court found that the Connecticut long-arm 
statute did in fact confer jurisdiction, and that the state court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Deiter was consistent with due process.25 
While the District Court had reasoned that Deiter had not used a Connecticut 
computer, but rather had used a Canadian computer to send information to her 
personal Canadian email account, the Second Circuit pointed to the fact that “[i]n 
order to use [her] MacDermid e-mail account and to obtain said confidential data 
files, Ms. Deiter accessed computer servers located in MacDermid’s offices in 
Waterbury, Connecticut.”26 Furthermore, the court held that a “computer server” is 
included within the Connecticut long-arm statute’s incorporated definition of a 
“computer” because it is: 
An electronic . . . device . . . that, pursuant to . . . human instruction . . . can 
automatically perform computer operations with . . . computer data and can 
communicate the results to another computer or to a person [or is a] connected or 
directly related device . . . that enables the computer to store, retrieve or 
communicate . . . computer data . . . to or from a person, another computer or 
another device.27 
Thus, the court found that, by accessing MacDermid’s server, Deiter had “used 
a computer in Connecticut” for the purposes of the state long-arm statute, despite 
                                                                                                     
 19. MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 727. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 728 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22. Id.; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52–59b(a)(5). 
 23. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-451(a)(1) (2012) (“‘Computer’ means an electronic, magnetic or optical 
device or group of devices that, pursuant to a computer program, human instruction or permanent 
instructions contained in the device or group of devices, can automatically perform computer operations 
with or on computer data and can communicate the results to another computer or to a person. 
‘Computer’ includes any connected or directly related device, equipment or facility that enables the 
computer to store, retrieve or communicate computer programs, computer data or the results of 
computer operations to or from a person, another computer or another device.”). 
 24. MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, No. 3:11-CV-00855-WWE, 2011 WL 6001625, at *3 (D. Conn. 
Nov. 30, 2011) (“That the information was originally obtained over the internet from a network of 
computers in Connecticut does not mean that the defendant used a computer network located within the 
state, as defined in [the computer crimes statute] . . .”).  
 25. MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 727 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 26. Id. at 728 (internal quotations omitted). 
 27. Id. at 728-29. 
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the fact that the “use” was remote.28 The court found this statutory interpretation 
reinforced by the fact that this particular long-arm provision was enacted as part of 
a broader statutory scheme aimed at combating unauthorized interference with 
computer programs or electronic data.29 The integration of this provision must have 
been intended to reach precisely these instances of remote access that would not 
otherwise be within the scope of the long-arm statute, the court reasoned.30 
Having found the Connecticut court’s jurisdiction over Deiter proper under the 
state long-arm statute, the Circuit Court turned its attention to the second step in 
personal jurisdiction analysis: whether such exercise of jurisdiction is within the 
bounds of due process.31  
Citing International Shoe,32 the court first examined whether sufficient 
minimum contacts existed between Deiter and the state of Connecticut such that 
“maintenance of the suit [would] not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”33 Stemming from the fact that MacDermid had specifically 
alleged that “Deiter knew that the email servers she used and the confidential files 
she misappropriated were both located in Connecticut,” the court reasoned that 
Deiter had purposefully availed herself of the “privilege of conducting computer 
activities” within Connecticut’s borders.34 While noting that this may not be the 
case for the average internet user, the court found that, by the terms of her 
employment contract, Deiter specifically knew “of the centralization and housing 
of [MacDermid’s] email system and the storage of [MacDermid’s information] in 
Waterbury, Connecticut” such that she invoked the benefits and protections of 
Connecticut state law when she used her MacDermid email to transfer MacDermid 
information.35 Additionally, the court invoked Calder36 and found that Deiter had at 
least directed allegedly tortious conduct toward a Connecticut corporation.37 
The Second Circuit next considered whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction in this instance would be reasonable.38 In light of the factors set forth in 
Asahi,39 the court found Connecticut’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Deiter 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id. at 729 (“It is not material that Deiter was outside of Connecticut when she accessed the 
Waterbury servers.  The statute requires only that the computer or network, not the user, be located in 
Connecticut.  The statute reaches persons outside the state who remotely access computers within the 
state . . . ”). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. (“Extending the statute to reach a nonresident who committed any of the above activities 
while present in Connecticut would not have been necessary because that person would already have 
been subject to jurisdiction under § 52-59b(a)(2). Further, it cannot be said that Deiter’s conduct is 
covered by § 52-59b(a)(3) because she is not alleged to have regularly conducted business in 
Connecticut, or to have derived revenue from her conduct.”). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 33. MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 730 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 790 (1984) (Finding the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction in 
California when a Floridian defendant had directed defamatory conduct toward a California resident). 
 37. MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 730. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987).  See also MacDermid, 
702 F.3d at 730 (“A court must consider [1] the burden on the defendant, [2] the interests of the forum 
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to be within the bounds of due process reasonableness.40 Specifically, the court 
found that both the state of Connecticut and MacDermid had significant interests in 
resolving this dispute in Connecticut—MacDermid being a Connecticut 
corporation and the state having an interest in the proper interpretation of its laws.41 
The court also emphasized the sound public policy of establishing identity between 
the forum state and the state from which electronic data has been 
misappropriated.42 Finally, and ironically, the court cited the conveniences of 
modern technology as sufficient abatement of any burden placed upon Deiter in 
having to defend her actions in Connecticut.43  
In conclusion, the Second Circuit held that the Connecticut District Court’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction in this matter was both proper with respect to the 
state long-arm statute and consistent with the constitutional fairness and 
reasonableness afforded a non-resident defendant.44 
II. PENNOYER TO MCINTYRE: 135 YEARS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Placing MacDermid within the context of the prevailing personal jurisdiction 
framework will require a brief digression to explore the history of jurisdictional 
jurisprudence.  
Pennoyer v. Neff45 set the framework for modern personal jurisdiction doctrine 
with an emphasis on the limited power of sovereign states to reach defendants 
outside of their borders.46 Here, Justice Field invoked principles of international 
law to define the scope of the state’s sovereign authority.47 Thus, while the 
Pennoyer personal jurisdiction inquiry centers on the scope of the state’s sovereign 
authority over non-consenting, non-resident defendants, the defendants’ Fourteenth 
Amendment rights also lurk within the opinion.48 Concerned that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause may not adequately protect against the intrastate enforcement of a 
judgment that is void as violative of sovereignty principles, Justice Field pointed to 
the Due Process Clause as a defendant’s shield against jurisdiction-less 
judgments.49 In sum, Pennoyer established the scope of state power as the 
appropriate starting point for answering questions of jurisdictional reach, and drew 
upon due process as a basis for resisting in-state judgments in excess of the state’s 
authority.50 
                                                                                                     
State, and [3] the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination [4] the 
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and [5] the 
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”). 
 40. MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 731. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 727. 
 45. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 46. Id. at 722. 
 47. Id. at 729. 
 48. Id. at 733. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal 
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 732 (2012). 
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In 1945, however, International Shoe v. Washington51 established due process 
as the constitutional norm by which the legitimacy of personal jurisdiction was to 
be measured.52 It was here that the Supreme Court constructed a constitutional 
framework for modern jurisdictional jurisprudence that, for most, would be a 
touchstone53 for the next century:  
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”54 
Thus, now it was due process itself that provided the criterion for determining the 
legitimacy of a particular state’s assertion of judicial power over a non-resident 
defendant.  
As a threshold matter, there must be sufficient minimum contacts established 
between the non-resident defendant and the forum state.55 Without such relation or 
ties, an exercise of jurisdictional authority by the state would offend the 
defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.56 Accordingly, 
International Shoe established an unambiguous shift in personal jurisdiction 
analysis from state-centric to defendant-centric.  
Subsequent case law endeavored to further define just how much process is 
due a foreign defendant in the context of personal jurisdiction by developing the 
test alluded to in International Shoe and demanded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.57 Out of these refinements arose new verbal formulations that are 
standard fixtures in modern jurisdictional jurisprudence: a requirement that there be 
“some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum [s]tate,”58 including circumstances where 
tortious activity is directed at or has an effect within the forum state,59 and a 
requirement that the claim arise out of or relate to forum-based activities.60  
Additionally, courts will consider a number of factors to determine whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be “reasonable” in light of competing 
interests, potential burdens, and public policy.61 These reasonableness factors 
include:  
                                                                                                     
 51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 52. See Perdue, supra note 50, at 733 (“Under the Pennoyer approach, the due process violation 
consisted of enforcing a judgment rendered by a court that lacked legitimate authority, but the standards 
for determining legitimacy were derived separately from that clause. In contrast, International Shoe 
suggests that the Due Process Clause itself embodies certain criteria for legitimacy.”)  
 53. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 
 54. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 55. Id. at 319. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 58. Id. at 253. 
 59. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
 60. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472.  
 61. See also id. at 477; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
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[1] [T]he burden on the defendant, [2] the interests of the forum State . . . [3] the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief . . . [4] the interstate judicial system’s interest 
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and [5] the shared 
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.62 
Thus, the trajectory of modern jurisdictional jurisprudence has had its origins 
not in Pennoyer, but in International Shoe and its defendant-driven approach.63 
Despite the Court’s repeated implicit repudiation of the rationale set forth in 
Pennoyer, the state sovereignty theme has laid dormant in personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence, occasionally erupting in tumultuous concurrences or dissents and 
injecting uncertainty into the jurisdictional landscape, much to the chagrin of Civil 
Procedure students everywhere.64  
The most recent recurrence of the state sovereignty-centric analysis was 
confounding indeed. In 2011, J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro,65 a plurality 
opinion by Justice Kennedy, invoked 1878’s Pennoyer and appeared to place 
federalism at the heart of a personal jurisdiction analysis involving modern 
commerce.66 However, unlike Pennoyer, and despite the plurality’s emphasis on 
state sovereignty as the proper starting point for determining the state’s 
jurisdictional reach, the opinion seems to define the scope of state authority not by 
principles of international law, but rather in reference to the defendant’s actions.67 
Justice Kennedy explains, “it is the defendant’s actions . . . that empower a State’s 
courts to subject him to judgment”68 – specifically, whether such actions “manifest 
an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”69 Thus, the McIntyre plurality’s 
effective holding can be surmised as: a state court may not properly exercise 
jurisdiction over a defendant unless that defendant has purposefully availed itself of 
doing business in the forum state or placed goods in the stream of commerce with 
                                                                                                     
 62. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113. 
 63. Indeed, in 1982’s Insurance Corp. of Ireland, the Court explicitly recognized the reality of 
modern personal jurisdiction doctrine and its defendant-centric approach. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie 
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). The Court specifically confronted the tug-of-war 
between federalism and individual liberty in personal jurisdiction precedent, ultimately siding with due 
process as the proper standard: 
The restriction on state sovereign power . . . must be seen as ultimately a function of the 
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only 
source of the personal jurisdiction requirement, and the Clause itself makes no mention of 
federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent 
restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the 
personal jurisdiction requirement: individual actions cannot change the powers of 
sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers from which he may 
otherwise be protected.  
Id. at 703 n.10. 
 64. Cf. Perdue, supra note 50, at 734-40 (discussing the majority opinions in favor of a due process-
centric analysis, the dissenting, concurring and sometimes majority opinions emphasizing due process, 
and the resulting confusion). 
 65. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 66. Id. at 2785-89. 
 67. Perdue, supra note 50, at 742-43. 
 68. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789. 
 69. Id. at 2788. 
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the expectation they would be purchased in the forum state.70 In this case, the 
plurality found that the foreign business had not purposefully availed itself of the 
privilege of conducting business in any U.S. state in particular by targeting the U.S. 
market in general.71 
Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg replied: “the constitutional limits on a state 
court's adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not state 
sovereignty.”72 Thus, true to the trajectory set forth in 1945, Justice Ginsburg set 
out to reaffirm that the proper personal jurisdiction inquiry is grounded in 
considerations of due process, fairness and individual rights.73 Despite her apparent 
reassertion of International Shoe fundamental fairness canons, however, Justice 
Ginsburg’s rationale did not mirror the defendant-centric approach of International 
Shoe’s progeny.74 Rather, Justice Ginsburg’s analysis asked to what extent states 
are reasonably empowered to provide redress for injuries occurring within their 
borders, particularly in the broad context of modern commerce.75 Accordingly, 
Justice Ginsburg concluded: “it would undermine principles of fundamental 
fairness to insulate the foreign manufacturer from accountability in court at the 
place within the United States where the manufacturer's product caused injury.”76 
Though it may seem that these discrepant jurisdictional formulations are really 
only getting at the same idea by way of varying terms of art, the point from which a 
justice begins his or her analysis can affect the ultimate terminus of the litigation—
a prime example being the plurality’s declining to find jurisdiction in McIntyre as 
opposed to the result the dissent would have returned. The plurality focused on 
state sovereignty but defined it by way of individual liberty, resulting in a limited 
view of a state’s sovereign authority.77 The dissent, on the other hand, emphasized 
the individual’s due process rights, but framed the question as one of the 
“sensible . . . allocation of adjudicatory authority.”78 
The most significant takeaway from McIntyre, then, is that personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence is on shaky doctrinal ground while the realities of 
modern commerce and the increasing prevalence of remote data storage and access 
are creating a fertile environment for novel questions of sovereignty, purposeful 
availment, and fairness.  
III. WHERE DOES MACDERMID FIT? 
From a civil procedure standpoint, MacDermid is an orthodox, coherent, and 
transparent application of long-standing personal jurisdiction principles. 
                                                                                                     
 70. See id. at 2785. 
 71. Id. at 2790-91. 
 72. Id. at 2798. 
 73. Id. at 2798-2800. 
 74. Perdue, supra note 50, at 742-43. 
 75. Id. at 743. 
 76. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801-02. 
 77. Id. at 742. 
 78. Id.  
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A. Statutory Interpretation: Just How Long is the Arm? 
As a threshold matter, the Second Circuit properly found Deiter’s conduct to 
be within the scope of Connecticut’s long-arm statute. In so finding, the court 
showcased adaptability to the realities of modern computing both in its statutory 
construction analysis and its understanding of what is meant by “use” of a 
computer. This is best understood in contrast to the narrower position put forward 
by the district court.  
In declining to extend the long-arm statute to the conduct in question, the 
lower court focused on the fact that the physical “use” was exclusively in Canada; 
that is, the use of the internet between two computers in Canada.79 It found 
significance in the fact that the express statutory language makes no reference to 
use of the internet, but rather exclusively addresses the physical use of computers 
or computer networks within the state.80 Therefore, for the lower court, that Deiter 
had used the internet to originally obtain information from a Connecticut server 
was insufficient to confer jurisdiction because she had not “used” a computer or a 
computer network within the state.81 Furthermore, the district court placed 
significance on the fact that Deiter’s initial server access was authorized because 
she was, at the time, a MacDermid employee and was using her MacDermid 
computer.82 Again, it was only the subsequent transfer of the gathered information, 
which took place exclusively in Canada, that constituted the alleged tort.83  
But, as the Second Circuit opinion points out, the in-state physical actions seen 
by the district court as the only actions reached by the “use of an in-state computer” 
provision would already be reached by § 52-59b(a)(2), the provision addressing 
“torts committed outside of the state that cause injury within the state.”84 Therefore, 
the addition of § 52-59b(a)(5) and its cross reference to the state computer crimes 
statute would be redundant and ineffective in reaching any additional conduct if 
circuit courts were to adopt the lower court’s narrow approach. Furthermore, to 
find that a computer server is not a computer for the purposes of the cyber crime 
and long-arm statute would be to acknowledge the necessity of protecting 
electronic data while refusing to extend that protection to the actual devices on 
which such data is stored. Such an interpretation would ignore the realities of 
modern computing, where a dizzying mass of data is stockpiled in server rooms 
across the globe, and individuals can access, alter, or destroy that data via 
computing devices.85 In short, extending the jurisdictional reach anticipated by the 
Connecticut long-arm statute only as far as the physical use of a typical computing 
device within the state would frustrate the purpose of both the long-arm statute and 
                                                                                                     
 79. MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, No. 3:11-CV-00855-WWE, 2011 WL 6001625, at *3 (D. Conn., 
Nov. 30, 2011). 
 80. Id. (“If the legislature had meant internet instead of computer network it would have said so.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at *4. 
 83. Id. 
 84. MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 729 (2d. Cir 2012). 
 85. JONATHAN I. EZOR, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN BUSINESS: LAWS AND PRACTICES 259-
62 (2012). 
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the broader computer crimes statute: combating injurious remote access.86  
Likewise, the district court’s emphasis on the initial access being technically 
authorized fails to account for the mechanics of modern technology. Because 
MacDermid’s email system is stored on the Waterbury servers, the very act of 
reading or sending an email necessarily involves accessing those servers.87 In fact, 
every time Deiter viewed, changed, or deleted MacDermid customer accounts or 
other company information, the properties of a Waterbury server changed ever so 
slightly.88 Taking these mechanisms into account, the district court’s distinction 
here—where, so long as the initial access is lawful, any subsequent remote misuse 
is beyond the reach of the forum law—makes little sense.89 Again, taking such a 
narrow view of “access” would acknowledge that certain electronic data deserves 
the protection of law, but fail to adequately protect the very substance of that data.   
Accordingly, the Second Circuit’s determination that Deiter had used a 
computer located within the state of Connecticut gives effect to the state’s intent to 
protect electronic property harbored within its borders, and also exemplifies a 
cognizance of modern technology. The Second Circuit’s job was not done yet, 
however, as it proceeded to apply constitutional principles of personal jurisdiction 
as set forth by Supreme Court precedent. Thus, the circuit court conducted a 
defendant-centric due process review.90 
B. Due Process Analysis 
First, the court found sufficient minimum contacts established by Deiter’s 
actions.91  Relying on MacDermid’s allegation that Deiter had expressly 
acknowledged the physical whereabouts of MacDermid data systems in her 
employment contract, the court comfortably found that Deiter had purposefully 
availed herself of conducting computing activities in Connecticut.92 Thus, the court 
took advantage of the rare opportunity presented by an express, memorialized 
knowledge of the location of electronic data. Deiter’s transfer of MacDermid data 
and use of MacDermid’s email system after explicitly recognizing the effect such 
behavior would have in Connecticut presents as clear an example of purposeful 
availment as a court can expect. 
Due Process precedent requires more than minimum contacts, as we know. 
                                                                                                     
 86. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 371 (D. Conn. Dec. 6, 2001) (“The fact that the 
computers were accessed by means of a complex process initiated and controlled from a remote location 
does not alter the fact that the accessing of the computers, i.e. part of the detrimental effect prohibited by 
the statute, occurred at the place where the computers were physically located, namely OIB's place of 
business in Vernon, Connecticut.”). 
 87. See Marshall Brain, How Web Servers Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
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 88. See id. 
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Accordingly, the court conducted a standard reasonableness review.93 Here, the 
court properly refused to recognize any preclusive burden on Deiter.94 After all, 
Deiter had no problem utilizing technology to penetrate Connecticut’s borders in 
the first instance—what sense would it make to now find it unreasonable to pull her 
into Connecticut physically, given modern transportation advancements?95 
Furthermore, the court gave proper weight to the interest of the state in providing a 
safe environment for electronic property storage, and to the broad public policy 
against cyber crime.96 In short, the court’s rationale reflected the sound, logical 
public policy response to the international cyber crime issue: hackers should have 
to come to us, not the other way around.  
MacDermid applied the proper analysis to reach the proper result in light of the 
realities of modern commerce and the policy considerations of providing adequate 
protection against hacking. To put it simply, MacDermid represents a proper 
adaptation of International Shoe to the data age. In fact, from a personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence standpoint, MacDermid is quite uninteresting. It seems 
likely that even the divided McIntyre Court might well find “purposeful availment” 
and personal jurisdiction in unanimity in this case.  
However, the MacDermid court’s ability to rely on extremely narrowing 
circumstances—an explicit “knowing” contractual provision—begs for an 
examination of modern factual scenarios beyond the scope of MacDermid. The 
question then becomes, even though the Second Circuit got it right in MacDermid, 
just how well equipped are our courts to handle novel issues of personal 
jurisdiction in the data age? In other words, early personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence asked: “can we, the states, reach outside of our boundaries to pull in 
non-resident defendants?” Subsequent jurisprudence responded “sometimes.” 
Then, personal jurisdiction case law set out to define the mechanisms for figuring 
out the “sometimes.” The MacDermid court applied these mechanisms and 
properly responded to the issue presented. Is our court system, as a whole, similarly 
well-equipped to figure out the “sometimes” in other cases involving technology? 
IV. FIGURING OUT THE “SOMETIMES” 
Short of a contractual acknowledgment as to the geographic location of 
electronic data, when does the fleeting nature of modern communication give rise 
to the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction? The answer depends on how far 
back into history we reach in order to inform our personal jurisdiction approach. 
A. Most of Us 
Most of us perhaps have no idea where our online actions produce effects, 
geographically. Thus, even when our actions constitute illegal activity, it is difficult 
to conclude that there has been purposeful availment sufficient to establish 
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minimum contacts with any particular state. To use a throwback internet term, 
driving down the information superhighway is decidedly different from driving 
down I-95. When someone navigates a physical interstate highway in the direction 
of, say, Massachusetts, she continuously makes decisions that reaffirm her intent to 
go to, and be in, Massachusetts. This is clearly distinguishable from online 
navigation, where clicking one link may activate electronic processes in California, 
and clicking on the next dials up servers in Washington D.C.97 Furthermore, in the 
latter context, this all happens instantaneously, with no commitment, let alone 
continuous re-commitment, by the individual. In short, establishing personal 
jurisdiction in a specific forum based on these fleeting electronic interactions 
would be a tall order for any plaintiff, whether analyzed from a due process or state 
sovereignty standpoint. 
Perhaps adequate notice regarding the geographical implications of certain 
online activity would facilitate a finding of purposeful availment in regard to 
litigation arising out of that activity. Of course, the question would then become: 
“what is adequate notice,”98 the consideration of which is beyond the scope of this 
Note. Suffice it to say that policy considerations against stifling electronic 
commerce may preclude any holdings that such notice confers jurisdiction.  
In the employment context, however, contractual provisions like the one in 
MacDermid will likely become more commonplace as businesses act to protect 
their data in a particular forum. Playing into this consideration will be the 
availability of long-arm provisions, like Connecticut’s, which confer jurisdiction 
based on computing activities. Again, these considerations, while interesting, are 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
B. Hackers: Intentional Thieves 
What is quite interesting is the scenario where a corporation has its principal 
place of business in, say, Connecticut, but stores its data on servers or a cloud 
service99 located in, say, California. A claim arises out of an alleged intentional 
misappropriation of data files from the California server. Under the defendant-
centric due process analysis of MacDermid and Justice Ginsburg’s McIntyre 
dissent, there does not seem to be much justification for denying the corporation’s 
ability to bring suit in California. California would be the site of the injury100 and, 
perhaps more importantly, the defendant here may be akin to a burglar who 
travelled to California, broke into the company’s building, stole its tangible 
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property, and then fled the state.101 Under the McIntyre plurality approach, 
however, California’s authority to exercise jurisdiction would be limited by a rigid 
application of purposeful availment. It is entirely foreseeable that the McIntyre 
plurality, much like it did in McIntyre itself, would find the defendant here to not 
have sufficiently subjected itself of either state’s authority.102 Furthermore, taking 
the plurality opinion’s sovereignty language at its word would require an inquiry 
into whether suit in California would infringe upon Connecticut’s authority, or 
indeed, whether judgment in California would be valid at all. 
In the same vein, consider a Connecticut corporation that maintains an 
intricate, multi-state system of servers to handle its data assets. The analysis and 
accompanying result would likely vary, as in the previous example, depending on 
whether one approaches the analysis from a due process or state authority point of 
view. Again, if due process is the standard, a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over a claim resulting from an intentional misappropriation from any one of these 
servers would likely be proper.103 However, from a federalism starting point, even 
an eventual acute harm in one particular state may not indicate the defendant’s 
submission to the authority of that state.  
C. Hackers: Cyber Attacks 
Much like an intentional misappropriation of proprietary data, a targeted, 
individualized cyber attack104 would be likely to confer jurisdiction in the state that 
hosts the damaged server under a due process analysis.105 This analysis asks what 
the defendant knew or reasonably should have known so that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in the forum state would not infringe upon her constitutional 
rights. Thus, a targeted cyber attack would permit a finding that the attacker 
purposefully availed itself of the state’s benefits, or could reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there.106 A narrowly targeted attack may also confer 
jurisdiction under a state sovereignty analysis but, as described in the previous 
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subsection, where the plaintiff’s operation or data storage spans multiple 
sovereignties, the picture becomes less clear.  
Ironically, the more widespread the attack and, consequently, the larger the 
radius of detrimental effects, the less certain any exercise of personal jurisdiction 
becomes.107 For example, a massive attack waged by Russian or Chinese hackers 
upon U.S. servers in all 50 states would not be unlike J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. 
targeting U.S. market penetration in general. Thus, whether the cyber attack is 
successful in all states or one, a court adhering to McIntyre principles may very 
well find that the hackers had not subjected themselves to the authority of any state 
in particular. A New Jersey corporation heavily damaged as a result of the attack 
may be out of luck in New Jersey, or anywhere else.108 Furthermore, under a 
sovereignty analysis, a foreign hacker may enjoy immunities that a domestic hacker 
may not.109 
D. Gray Areas: Digital Trespass, SPAM, and Diminishing Bandwidth 
Somewhere between “hacker” and “average internet user” lies a bit of a gray 
area, which contains individuals who access restricted servers without 
authorization,110 spammers who flood servers or inundate subscribers with 
unsolicited information,111 and individuals who purposefully or innocently demand 
a server’s limited bandwidth.112  In-depth treatment of the jurisdictional 
considerations of each of these types of behavior is beyond the scope of this Note. 
But the extent to which we view the proper analysis as one that “ensures a 
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ 
‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts,”113 as opposed to one regarding the scope of a 
sovereign’s authority, will dictate how we come out on these issues, as we have 
seen in McIntyre. 
V. CONCLUSION 
MacDermid is a model for how state courts should respond to novel 
jurisdictional questions presented by the ambiguities of the data age. The traditional 
due process mechanism set forth in International Shoe and developed by 
subsequent case law provides the adaptability demanded of modern courts. This 
defendant-centric approach ensures a case-by-case-like analysis of each new 
nuanced set of facts involving increasingly interconnected technology. It 
necessarily involves consideration of the realities of modern commerce and 
communication, as it sets out to determine, as a threshold matter, whether sufficient 
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minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state. Of course, 
these minimum contacts may be technological in nature.114 Furthermore, in the 
required due process reasonableness test, courts necessarily must weigh the broader 
technological and commercial context in which the transaction that gives rise to 
litigation takes place.  
In short, MacDermid showcases the Second Circuit’s proper adaptation of 
International Shoe principles to reach the proper, logical, and desirable result in the 
data age. Conjuring up realistic scenarios outside of the scope of the convenient 
facts presented by MacDermid showcases the flexibility and appropriateness of the 
due process mechanism utilized by the Second Circuit. Upon consideration of the 
issues discussed in the previous section, the MacDermid approach consistently 
yields the proper result in the furtherance of individual liberty, public policy, data 
protection and, indeed, the state’s interests.  
There is turmoil in the broader jurisdictional landscape, however. Just how far 
back into history should we look to shape our modern jurisdictional framework? 
Though McIntyre does not appear to be a complete revivification of Pennoyer—the 
contacts analysis appears alive and well—the plurality opinion does direct us to 
begin the inquiry with sovereignty and the capacity of the state to render judgment 
over a non-resident defendant. As we have seen in the previous section, this 
approach seems to lead to inefficient and inconsistent results when the alleged 
behavior is ambiguous. And as we constantly push the frontier of technological 
innovation, our virtual actions are increasingly geographically ambiguous. The 
sovereignty-centric approach places ultimate significance on borders as borders 
become less significant.115 This approach sacrifices proper consideration of the 
realities of the modern marketplace, and thus fails to account for the actual 
behavior of the defendant in this context. Thus, as the current personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence is apparently in flux, it appears we are in danger of an inconsistent 
application and enforcement of data protection laws. The dangers of such 
inconsistency for those relying on sensitive proprietary data—individuals, 
businesses, and governments—are bad enough,116 but such a patchwork approach 
has potentially disastrous implications for the state’s ability to provide a safe haven 
for its citizen’s sensitive and proprietary data.117 That such hindrance upon a 
significant state interest has its roots in a revivification of the sovereignty-centric 
approach to personal jurisdiction analysis is, of course, ironic.  
The state of our personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, then, provides little useful 
guidance for state courts faced with novel issues in the data age. Perhaps it is 
encouraging that state courts nonetheless seem prepared to adapt traditional 
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jurisdictional principles to the electronic age.118 But a lack of guidance breeds 
inconsistency,119 and inconsistency begets unfairness and inadequate protection. 
Given modern commerce’s increasing reliance upon data,120 and the increasing 
amount of sensitive personal data accumulating on servers globally,121 inadequate 
protection could pose serious dangers for businesses, governments, and consumers.  
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